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Panel of Former Solicitors General 
Charles Fried: Solicitor General, 1985-1989. 
Kenneth W. Starr: Solicitor General, 1989-1993. 
Drew S. Days, III: Solicitor General, 1993-1996. 
Walter E. Dellinger, III: Solicitor General, 1996-1997. 
Seth P. Waxman: Solicitor General, 1997-2001. 
Professor Thomas R. Lee245 : I have been asked to moderate 
this final session. What I would like to do is, in the first instance, 
direct a question to one member of the panel and then ask for maybe 
two or three others to respond to the comments that have been 
made or give some other further response to my question. Many of 
these issues have been covered to some degree in earlier sessions, and, 
I think one of the opportunities we will have here is for some 
discussion and debate, comparing and contrasting the views of the 
solicitors general who are here with us today. 
Let me start by reading from the Judiciary Act of 1870,246 and let 
me start by directing this question to General Starr. I was going to 
start with General Fried, but he asked me to direct a different 
question to him that he is also interested in answering. So, General 
Starr, let me start with you. The statute says: "There shall be an 
officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney General. ,,247 An 
oversimplified organizational structure might tell us, then, that the 
hierarchal relationship here runs from the president to the attorney 
general and down to the solicitor general. I would like you to talk 
about that relationship, the relationship that the solicitor general has 
to the attorney general and also to the president, and specifically 
discuss, if you would, the obligations, the responsibilities, that the 
solicitor general has to communicate with the attorney general and 
245. Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
246. Judiciary Act ofl870, ch. 150,16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
247. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000). 
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with the president. And then I will ask other members of the panel 
to respond. 
Kenneth Starr: I think the statute is wonderfully straightforward 
and simple: "to assist the Attorney General." I found in my own 
experience that that meant when the phone rang and it was-
"Would you please cover a moot court for me in the following 
wonderful law school in some remote hamlet?" (not Provo!)-the 
answer was always "Yes," unfailingly "Yes." One simply tried to assist 
the attorney general in a variety of ways. 
I found in my own experience, in contrast to that of Solicitor 
General Lee, whose memory we honor in the course of this 
gathering, that I was not being summoned about substantive matters 
with any regularity, and I have been struck by the comments thus far 
by my colleagues as to the collaborative and collegial kind of 
arrangement that included consultations with the president. The 
only time I was consulted by or, I should say, directed by the 
president, was to overrule me on a particular matter. It was a narrow 
matter, but obviously of importance to the president. So, I found in 
my own experience-and I think this is consistent within the 
traditions of the office-growing out of that simple statute, that the 
solicitor general is expected to carry on the duties of the office and 
to report, to provide information about those issues that the attorney 
general should know about, as well as the deputy attorney general, 
and for the last generation, in the main, the associate attorney 
general, given the division of responsibility in the department. 
That [was] in contrast to General Lee's experience, which was so 
wonderfully explained by Solicitor General Olson last evening at the 
marvelous banquet. Rex would be with us, as John Roberts will 
recall, literally daily for the attorney general's staff meeting. I do not 
know this, but I think there may have been [some] in the Office of 
the Solicitor General that questioned whether that was really 
appropriate. Is the appearance of the solicitor general literally daily 
going down the halls of the fifth floor and joining in the attorney 
general's senior leadership daily meeting appropriate? I felt it was, for 
similar reasons that I thought it was appropriate that the attorney 
general saw fit to summon the FBI Director with regularity, and 
also, if he so chose, to literally have an office in the FBI. We were all 
part of one organized whole. And Rex was not there to have his 
judgment overridden. He was there to provide timely information as 
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well as to provide his excellent judgment on a wide range of matters. 
And again, I thought that was an entirely appropriate role. 
But in my experience serving under Attorney General [Richard] 
Thornburgh and Attorney General [William] Barr, there was less 
day-to-day engagement. We did have a weekly meeting with the 
solicitor general alone, and John [Roberts] would handle that in my 
absence, where we would really just give a report. It was typically a 
one-way report: "Here is in fact what is going on." The sense I had, 
and I guess the lesson that I draw from that, is that there really is 
overwhelmingly a culture of deference that obtains among the 
various senior officers of the Justice Department and that, I think, 
goes as well with respect to the White House. Our colleagues from 
the Clinton administration will comment, I hope, before this larger 
audience in terms of relationships with the president and perhaps 
with senior White House staff. My own experience was [that] we had 
very limited contact. I am not suggesting it as a virtue, but it simply 
is a fact that it was viewed as unwise for the White House Counsel's 
Office to be weighing in with the solicitor general. If there was an 
expression of concern, it would come to the attorney general or the 
deputy attorney general. 
Not that the culture of independence was being vaunted-far 
from it. We viewed ourselves as an integral part of the Justice 
Department, to assist in ways that might be entirely unexpected. 
There was also a cultural outlook that we were an organization 
presented from time to time with very challenging missions. 
Maureen Mahoney made some of these comments at yesterday 
afternoon's session of the Bush panel-namely, that we would be 
called upon, as Ted Olson has been called upon, to handle a variety 
of sticky-wicket matters. She recalled, and I recall not entirely 
pleasantly, nocturnal PI hearings in the Southern District of Florida, 
and I found myself on the floor leading the team. I recall our 
beloved now-Judge Bill Bryson, a very distinguished deputy solicitor 
general during our watch, being summoned by the attorney general 
personally. The matter was the assertion by Manuel Antonio 
Noriega248 that he was entitled to prisoner of war status under the 
Geneva Conventions. That, I am sure, was an issue the district 
248. Noriega, the former president of Panama, was captured by United States troops and 
brought to the United States, where he was tried and convicted in April 1992 on charges of 
racketeering, money laundering, and drug trafficking. 
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attorney's office in Miami had not handled with any regularity, nor 
had a lot of lawyers in the Justice Department. Frankly, neither had 
Bill Bryson, but the attorney general knew that in that cadre of 
lawyers, and especially among the career civil servants in that office, 
were people where the interest of the United States would be best 
protected. I found that kind of special assignment throughout the 
process. I did not hear a lot of grumbling about this, you know, but 
[occasionally someone] might say in the office or outside [the 
office], "Is this proper?" But of course it is [proper]; we simply exist 
statutorily to assist the attorney general and, through the attorney 
general, [to assist] the president and the causes that the executive 
branch calls upon the office to do. 
The final thing I will say is that-and this was a very substantial 
expenditure of time-that I was asked, I think again consistently 
with the statute, to take on the responsibility for heading up a 
working group on civil justice reform, to have a very elaborate 
inter-agency and also outreach process to the legal community and 
then to fashion recommendations. Unusual, but again, I think, a 
tribute to the office and the expertise of the office in a wide variety 
of matters. 
Thomas Lee: Thank you, General Starr. Responses to General 
Starr's comments or further thoughts about the relationship between 
the solicitor general and his bosses? 
Charles Fried: Just one word. And this comments more on the 
reports by the Clinton people, particularly Walter's frequent 
encounters with his president. I had none except our formal social 
events with the president. And the reason, I think, is very clear. 
Walter's president was a former law professor. My president was a 
former governor, but very far from a former law professor. And the 
same is true of Ken's president, and for that matter, Ted Olson's 
president. 
Walter Dellinger: A second comment on that. I am surprised at 
the notion that was put about at the time of the Bakkt?49 decision, 
which Drew Days was involved in as head of the Civil Rights 
Division. (There is a very famous book for those of you who do not 
249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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know it, The Tenth Justice, by Lincoln Caplan.2SO ) A couple of things 
about that are interesting. The administration had formulated a 
position to take on affirmative action. I believe, if I am correct, that 
Frank Easterbrook was the assistant to the solicitor general who did 
the first memorandum. The notion is, should the White House have 
interfered with what policy was being developed by the career people 
in the Solicitor General's Office? It does strike me as odd on a 
question like that, where I think the Constitution is open-ended, and 
certainly the precedents were open-ended, that there should be any 
question but that the president ought to have a say in where his 
administration is going to urge the Court to go. I will say that I am 
second to no one in my admiration for Judge Frank Easterbrook, but 
I do not understand why a Carter-Mondale administration would 
have its policy set by Frank Easterbrook. What you do want is his 
best thinking on the issue as part of the process. More at OLC, the 
Office of Legal Counsel, but also to some extent at the SG's Office, I 
never addressed a sensitive issue without involving career people 
from previous administrations. The great protection of a political 
appointee is to take career people who came in under different 
presidents and get their involvement. So, I think that is critically 
important. 
But the other aspect of that is who talks to whom. There was a 
notion that Wade McCree was protecting Solicitor General Lee from 
White House pressure. I, for one, would not want anyone in the 
White House speaking to the attorney general or the deputy attorney 
general instead of speaking to me about a matter within the bailiwick 
of the Solicitor General's Office. Not that they are not free to do so, 
but I would want to be included in such a conversation and have it 
myself. By the same token, I would never want them speaking to 
career people without our direct permission. That is why you have 
political people who can stand up to that. 
The reason for meeting with the president personally, though 
I do agree it is because [the president] would be involved, is so that 
the office, or the department, is not pushed around by more political 
functionaries in the White House political operation. By having 
direct access to the president, [I could say] as solicitor general, 
"They are wrong. Here is why it is not in the interest of the United 
States, and here is why their interest is short-sighted and political." 
250. CAPLAN,supranote 23. 
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In guarding the role of the office, it seems to me the issue should 
not be independence, because independence means independence 
for people who are elected by the people of the United States. So it 
is hard to maintain that as an ultimate virtue. What we seek from 
independence [for the SG's Office] is that the United States' 
positions reflect the long-range interest of the United States and are 
based on arguments that are made with professional responsibility 
and are respectful of the Court's precedents. You can achieve that, I 
think, more often by engaging at the highest levels of the 
administration rather than by trying to wall the office off. But in 
different administrations, there may be different styles on that point. 
Drew Days: I think that is really the fact, that there are a 
number of different personal styles that vary from administration to 
administration and there are administrations where solicitors general 
met with presidents. I think of Archibald Cox and John F. Kennedy. 
The reason why they met was because they had a prior relationship. 
Archibald Cox was an advisor to Senator John Kennedy and, 
therefore, it was perfectly natural for the president to reach out to 
someone who had been his advisor for a number of years. 
But in other circumstances, I think that is quite problematic. For 
one thing, unless one has a personal relationship with the president, 
it is not clear that one gets to the president very often. One is talking 
to surrogate presidents or self-declared mini-presidents. And I do 
not think that really is a productive use of one's time as a solicitor 
general. I found in the Clinton administration during the few times 
that I went over to the White House, that when I talked to lawyers 
there, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a group of munchkins 
who came in the door and proceeded to kibitz about legal issues 
they knew nothing of. And so I took to meeting with lawyers from 
the White House outside of the White House. We had very nice 
lunches together where we could talk law without the echo and the 
peanut gallery. 
You mentioned the Bakke case. The situation there was that the 
president of the United States trusted the attorney general totally, 
and he basically said to the attorney general, "I trust you to make a 
decision. I am not trusting the vice president or the head of the 
domestic counsel to make these decisions. If they want to say things, 
listen to them, but you are the ultimate decision-maker in that 
matter, and if you decide that Wade McCree and Drew Days should 
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work this out without having calls from the vice president or some 
other people in the White House, that is fine with me." So that is 
the dynamic of that situation. 
But I agree with you; the notion that we should think of the 
solicitor general as independent of the president is terribly 
misguided. In fact, I have told this story before, so forgive me if you 
have heard me tell it. But what turned out to be my job interview 
with President Clinton was on the day that Janet Reno was 
confirmed as attorney general. I went into the Oval Office with 
President Clinton, and I was prepared for a linear interrogation: you 
know, question one, and then followed by question two, and so 
forth. But no; it was kind of an Arkansas get-acquainted meeting, a 
comfort-level type of conversation. And well into the meeting, the 
president looked at me in his inimitable fashion and said, "What is 
the relationship between the president and the solicitor general?" 
And I said, "Mr. President, you are in the Constitution and the 
solicitor general is not." I somewhat regretted that after the fact, 
giving him that insight. But I really believe that. 
I have worked in two Justice Departments and two 
administrations. And as I mentioned, President Carter was pretty 
much a delegator of his responsibility to the attorney general and 
fiercely protected people in the Justice Department from all kinds of 
interference, interventions, telephone calls, and so forth. That is one 
way to run a Justice Department. But upon reflection over the years, 
I am not sure that it is the most responsive to the constitutional 
framework. It worked, I think, for the Carter administration. But I 
think the notion that everybody understands that the president is the 
ultimate decision-maker under Article II is very healthy and helpful 
to the way that the process works. 
Let me say one more thing about the attorney general. Again, 
this varies from administration to administration, but I saw my 
relationship with Janet Reno as a symbiotic one, that we were really 
reinforcing one another in a number of ways that were productive 
and constructive. I always realized that she could overrule me, but I 
think she always realized that I spent more time thinking about a lot 
of the issues that were confronting the Justice Department at the 
Supreme Court and the lower court levels than she did, and that that 
worked out very well. 
But there are situations where the relationship can be very 
painful for one or the other of those officers. Robert Jackson was 
159 
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solicitor general before he became attorney general. He never made 
the transition in terms of who should argue cases before the Supreme 
Court, as I understand it, and so he was continually muscling in and 
taking over matters that by rights should have been handled by the 
solicitor general. 
Seth Waxman: I agree entirely that the chain of command is 
clear and that the Framers managed to make it all the way through 
all the articles of the Constitution without even conceiving of a 
solicitor general, let alone bothering to mention an attorney general. 
It is important nonetheless to distinguish between those things the 
solicitor general does pursuant to the longstanding notice-and-
comment regulation, and the other things a solicitor general may do 
pursuant to his (and, someday, her!) statutory obligation to be of 
general assistance to the attorney general. 
As to the former-representing the United States in the Supreme 
Court, deciding when the United States should appeal in any court, 
authorizing amicus participation in any appellate court, and 
authorizing intervention in defense of the constitutionality of an act 
of Congress-the solicitor general's job is to make decisions. It is not 
to make recommendations. It is not to seek advice. It is to stop the 
buck on his desk, make a considered decision, and decide when the 
policy implications of the decision are of sufficient magnitude that 
the attorney general and, in some cases the president, should be 
advised. 
As to all other things-the sort of free-floating assistance Ted 
Olson is performing for the president and the attorney general now 
in the context of the USA PATRIOT Act/51 and which the rest of us 
did in other contexts, the scope of engagement and responsibility 
depends much more on the needs, practices, and proclivities of the 
president or the attorney general. 
The precise contours of the relationship between the solicitor 
general, on the one hand, and the attorney general and the 
president, on the other, depends on both the background strengths 
and inclinations of the other two and the personalities of all three. 
During my tenure at the Department of Justice, I had the benefit of 
251. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATIUOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001). 
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the opportunity personally to observe Drew Days' relationship with 
Attorney General Reno, and Walter Dellinger's relationship with 
both the attorney general and the president. That helped me 
enormously in navigating my own course between, and with, the two 
of them. I think this was especially important in my case because I 
had never worked with, or even known, either Janet Reno or Bill 
Clinton before I joined the government. 
I think Charles Fried's observation-about the difference it made 
that President Clinton was both a lawyer and a former constitutional 
law professor-is a singular insight. I will give you one anecdotal 
example (about which I have previously spoken and written) just to 
give you an example of what a difference it makes. 
The event occurred long before I became solicitor general. 
Indeed, I had been working for the United States for only three 
weeks, as an associate deputy attorney general. Bill Bryson, the 
acting associate attorney general (as well as a deputy solicitor 
general) invited me to accompany him to the White House where we 
were expected to explain to the counsel to the president why the 
United States had taken the position it did in a case called Christians 
v. Crystal Evangelical Church.252 The case involved the 
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
["RFRA"F53 and the application of that Act to an attempt by Julia 
Christians, who was the trustee in bankruptcy, to recover for the 
church a $40,000 tithe that parishioners had made en route to filing 
for personal bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee said, "Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, that is a fraudulent conveyance, and I would like 
the money back." The litigation concerned whether she could do 
that consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and 
whether, in that application at least, the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act was constitutional. The United States filed a brief in 
the case saying that the Act was constitutional and that a 
contribution to the church should be treated the same way as, say, a 
contribution to the Boy Scouts; this was not their money, this was 
their creditors' money. 
I had not heard about the case but went with Bill Bryson to 
explain our position (I did a lot of reading in the space of an hour!). 
252. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
253. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(1996). 
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Apparently, the president had heard about this; he had a very, very 
strong interest in the Free Exercise Clause. It was my first trip to the 
White House. 1 asked Bill, "What's this going to be like?" And he 
(having worked for his entire career at the Department of Justice) 
said, "I have no idea: this is my first trip to the White House too." 
We went into the Counsel's office, and started explaining the case. 
And after several minutes, the president himself walked in. 1 had 
never met him. He asked what we were discussing, and his counsel 
explained. And he said, "Well, I'd like to hear about that." He sat 
down, listened, and then started peppering us with questions about 
Sherbert v. Verner254 and other Religion Clause precedents-many of 
which 1 could not readily bring to mind. 1 remember being 
absolutely amazed that he could recall these cases and recall their 
holdings. My vivid memory is of thinking to myself, "This guy is the 
leader of the free world, and he's spending twenty minutes talking 
about First Amendment doctrine." 
We heard nothing from the White House for two or three 
months. One day 1 received a call from the White House Counsel 
saying, "The president has been considering this Christians matter, 
and he has decided that the position the United States took is 
wrong. He has directed that the brief be withdrawn." 1 hung up the 
phone, called Bill Bryson, and said, "Look, 1 don't know how often 
this happens, but the president of the United States has directed that 
this brief be withdrawn. Has the court decided the case?" He said, "I 
don't know." 
We made several calls. It turned out that the oral argument 
before the Eighth Circuit was scheduled for the very next day. The 
career lawyer from the Civil Division was already in the city at which 
the argument was to occur. We didn't reach him until the next 
morning-just as he was preparing to take a cab to the courthouse. 
Needless to say, he was a little stunned. So was the lawyer for trustee 
Christians, with whom he was dividing the argument. So was the 
Eighth Circuit. 
That anecdote provides a useful context, 1 think, for the 
relationship 1 had with the president. We didn't meet or discuss cases 
very often. But 1 felt entirely free when something of the magnitude 
of Dickerson255 or Piscatawaj56 arose to ask for some of his time. 
254. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
255. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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The point was not to ask him what on earth the United States 
should do. That's a decision in the first instance for the solicitor 
general to make. The purpose of the meeting was to make sure, 
given how important the issues were, to make sure that he agreed 
that the position we proposed to take represented an appropriate 
exercise of his constitutional authority. It is, after all, his 
constitutional authority, not the solicitor general's or the attorney 
general's. 
Thomas Lee: To move on to a different line of questioning, 
General Fried, let me ask you about the topic that you and I were 
discussing just before I stood up, which has to do with whether and 
under what circumstances the solicitor ought to urge the overruling 
of a decision of the United States Supreme Court. We were talking 
about the fact that during my father [Rex Lee]'s tenure as solicitor 
general, his approach to the abortion cases was to attempt to whittle 
away at them at the fringes but not to urge their overruling quite 
directly and that that was one of the first things that you did as 
solicitor general. So, maybe you can address that question 
specifically, and in general we will ask for other responses from the 
other members of the panel. 
Charles Fried: Well, first of all, it is sometimes said-I think it 
was said a number of times in the course of this conference-that the 
solicitor general must always act with deference to the Supreme 
Court, and with courtesy-that goes without saying. But the 
implication, and sometimes the explicit implication, is that it also 
means that one must stay within the precedents of the Supreme 
Court. Now, the latter is plainly and manifestly wrong. 
I think every solicitor general at some point has asked the 
Supreme Court to reconsider and overrule some of its prior 
decisions. Walter spoke about asking the Supreme Court to 
reconsider and overrule, which they did in the Agostini257 case, the 
previous very wrong decisions in Aguila,y.58 and Grand Rapids/59 
and that was a fine thing to do. One does not know how the law 
256. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.grallted, 
521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). 
257. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
258. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
259. Sch. Dist. v. Ball,473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
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could possibly progress and develop if this were really an inhibition. I 
certainly did on a number of occasions. In a case having to do with 
the jurisdiction of military tribunals, I asked as an act of piety to my 
old boss John Harlan that they overrule a terrible decision by Justice 
Douglas, called Q JCallahan,260 in the case called Solorio,261 and they 
did. That is how the law changes. 
The abortion situation was different because in that case it was 
rather unlikely that the Court would indeed overrule Roe v. Wade,262 
but here was the situation. At that time, I was not solicitor general; I 
was acting solicitor general. [Rex Lee] had left to go into private 
practice, and a permanent solicitor general had not yet been named. 
I had no expectation that it would be me. This was just where I was, 
and here was the job. I got, in the ordinary course, 
recommendations from relevant divisions in the department 
recommending that we ask for overruling. And here is what I knew. 
I knew that Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, had been severely 
criticized not [only] on right-to-life grounds, but on the grounds 
that it was a very poorly reasoned decision and a very bad piece of 
constitutional law. People like Paul Freund, Archibald Cox, and 
John Ely were on record in writing as having said that, and the case, 
of course, had continued to be very controversial. The president, 
[Ronald Reagan], had been elected, in part in the face of this 
controversy, stating his view over and over again that this was a 
terribly wrong decision. 
Now, at that point, the question came to me: should I not, in an 
appropriate brief, present that issue to the Supreme Court, even 
though they were unlikely to accept it? It had never been presented 
to them squarely before. I saw no excuse for not presenting that 
issue, and so I did. I presented it in terms of the jurisprudential 
defects of Roe v. Wade because that was the-how should I say-
"professionally correct" defect in the case. I did not present it in 
terms of right to life. I did not present it, as some people were 
urging me to do, to say that the unborn were persons protected by 
the Due Process Clause and so on and so forth, that in fact it would 
be unconstitutional to allow abortion (which, by the way, is the 
position taken by the very excellent German constitutional court, so 
260. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
261. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). 
262. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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it is not a crazy position at all), but that was not the ground. The 
ground we presented seemed to be appropriate. A majority of the 
Court brushed it aside, although interestingly enough-Roe v. Wade 
had been seven to two-this decision was five to four.263 So it is not 
as if it had not reached some minds. 
It came up again at a very strange moment. As I said I would, I 
had left the office with the end of my president's term, and I was 
back at Harvard teaching. Ken had not yet been confirmed, and 
there was a brief in there from the Department of Justice saying Roe 
v. Wade should be overruled.264 And the president asked me: would I 
come back to argue it? Now, I was a law professor at Harvard. I had 
no duty to anybody (except to meet my classes), but it seemed to me 
appropriate that somebody who had held that office present this 
argument to the Supreme Court. There had been a number of new 
Justices on the Court who had not ruled on it, and it seemed to me 
correct that this position about which the president felt very 
strongly, and the administration felt strongly, should be presented. I 
recall that I presented it in an argument which said that, of course, 
that does not mean that the states could do anything they wanted. 
For instance, they could not pass brutal, anti-abortion legislation. I 
expected to be questioned about that, and I was questioned, "What 
do you mean by that, Mr. Fried?" And I said, "For instance, 
legislation which allows you to disregard the health of the mother." 
And I suggested legislation which confused abortion and 
contraception to the point where perhaps even contraception might 
fall under a legislative cloud which would unravel things all the way 
back to Griswold.265 And I said quite explicitly, "We are not asking 
for that. We do not ask to unravel the law that far." 
Again, the Webster case resulted in a very confused opinion, one 
which indicated considerable sympathy, much more than in the 
previous instance, for the overruling position. So, it is not surprising 
to me-it seems to me exactly correct-that Ken in the Casey66 case 
should forthrightly have put that position, as he did. 
Now, I think, a further thing. If I were solicitor general 
tomorrow and were asked to do it again, I would not because I think 
263. Thornburgh v. Am. Coil. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
264. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
265. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
266. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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the Casey case has clearly given the Court the full opportunity to 
consider whether they want to overrule this decision. All the new 
members of the Court have now stood up and been heard from. To 
bring it up again would simply be harassment, and I would not do it. 
Indeed, I think for the time being, and perhaps really for a very long 
time, that issue is settled and I hope it is behind us. 
Kenneth Starr: It seemed even to be settled at a political level in 
light of Attorney General Ashcroft's comments at his confirmation 
hearing. 
I wanted to make a very brief comment, if I may, Tom, with 
respect to the broader issue. Stare decisis values have to be, it seems 
to me, assessed against the values of stability in the law. That is to 
say, is there really a sense of stability that the issue has truly been 
settled in a way that has been understood-has not seemed to sow 
seeds of confusion-and the precedent or the line of precedent does 
not stand as inimical, or as an obstacle, to the implementation of 
sensible public policies? 
On this panel, Walter can probably most authoritatively speak to 
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in light of his success as 
acting solicitor general in guiding and shaping some very important 
doctrine-and I think that story richly deserves to be retold here. 
But I want to use the Establishment Clause as another example, 
because the Court just seemed not to be able to come to rest with 
respect to something very basic: what does the Establishment Clause 
mean? There was the Lemon v. Kurtzman267 test, and then Justice 
O'Connor came up with the endorsement test in the context of a 
creche,268 but conclud[ed] that that was not an endorsement. So one 
tended to wonder: what does that mean, and what does that add to 
understanding? Then when it came time to assess very important 
questions of public policy, namely, Congress's actions and the 
president'S actions in the 1960s in providing salutary programs to 
inner-city or needy children, doctrine was really standing in the way. 
And it seems to me under those circumstances that you can say, 
"Lemon v. Kurtzman was on the books for so long, but were there 
expressions of discontent?" And there were. With the example [of 
Lemon], five Justices had expressed dismay at that particular test and 
267. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
268. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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how unhelpful it was. So I think that part of the lawyering craft is to 
[ask] how stable is that body of precedent, and then what kind of 
deleterious effects is it having on issues that are very important to the 
president and, really, to the American people? 
Drew Days: For me the most interesting part of what Charles 
said about seeking the overruling of a Supreme Court precedent is, 
"in an appropriate brief." And for me, that means not only an 
appropriate piece of paper, but appropriate work that has been done 
in the lower courts to develop a record-to have some factual basis 
for suggesting to the Court that the terms that it had available to it 
to rule in the earlier case have in fact changed; the circumstances 
have changed in a way that it really makes adherence to that 
precedent untenable. 
Thomas Lee: Let me ask General Days if he would respond to 
the next line of questions. It has to do with the change of 
administrations and what the solicitor general ought to do looking 
back at policies or positions that might have been taken by a prior 
administration. One way of thinking about this, I suppose, is what is 
the standard of review? Is it a de novo standard? Is it a clearly 
erroneous standard? Is it an abuse of discretion standard? Or is it 
maybe something even more deferential than that? 
Drew Days: I am not sure what the right standard is, but I went 
into the office thinking that it was my responsibility to maintain 
continuity in the law to the greatest extent possible and not take 
office on the assumption that I could start from scratch and simply 
ignore what had been done by prior administrations. Let me give 
you an example of that. 
Walter Dellinger mentioned earlier the Barclays Bank case.269 It 
was true that the president had a position on the taxing of 
multinational corporations. And to follow up on Seth's comment 
about the president, not only did he have views on this issue, but 
they were informed views, and they were probably correct views on 
this issue because as a former governor he had had experience with 
transfer pricing and the movement of money across country 
boundaries to avoid taxation in places with unfavorable provisions. 
269. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
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But Bill Clinton, the candidate, took the posItIon during the 
campaign that if he were elected president, he would enter the 
Barclays Bank case on the side of California, which is the position 
that we ultimately took. So that is one set of circumstances: a 
president committed politically, law professor, lawyer. The message 
has been sent and received by the solicitor general. 
But the solicitor general sits down and looks through the briefs 
that have been filed by his predecessors in the Solicitor General's 
Office, and they seem to point in the other direction. What is the 
right answer under those circumstances? Well, I will tell you. The 
right answer is to do what the president wants. (Since I had tenure at 
Yale Law School, I just told my staff that I might be gone, but they 
would be fine.) But I felt a responsibility to the Court in changing 
position on this issue, to explain how I arrived at that result, that it 
was not tossing darts at a board and just deciding that that was the 
right mark and going ahead. We spent a great deal of time-the 
White House, the Treasury Department, the State Department-
essentially conducting an autopsy of how my predecessor, Ken Starr, 
and some of his people came to the conclusion that they did. And I 
felt by the time we filed our brief that I had lived up to my 
responsibility to the president, but also lived up to my responsibility 
to the Office of Solicitor General. 
Walter Dellinger: Let me add that I do think that there is a very 
strong stare decisis weight to be given to positions taken by the 
United States and that one needs to persuade a president of that fact. 
But presidents, on the other hand, are elected. Sometimes they stand 
for something. No one has, I think, done that more clearly than 
President Reagan. Not everyone agreed with what he stood for, but 
few candidates in modern times, perhaps George McGovern, have 
made it clearer what they stood for than Ronald Reagan did. And he 
won. My defense of Charles Fried is that someone ought to be 
authorized to tell the Supreme Court that a new president thinks 
they are on the wrong course on a matter like Roe v. Wade, and that 
seems to me to be appropriate. 
Let me compare it to OLe. OLC is the Office of Legal Counsel, 
the next ranking position in the department, actually carved out of 
the rib of the Solicitor General's Office, which used to do both 
functions of providing legal advice to the government. The 
argument that there ought to be independence in the solicitor 
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general is actually much more apt for the Office of Legal Counsel 
because the Office of Legal Counsel is making legal rulings binding 
on the executive branch. You are telling the executive officials, "No. 
You may not do something." You are a lawmaker. You are at times 
telling the attorney general or the deputy attorney general, "I will 
not give you a legal opinion that you can undertake an extraordinary 
rendition by doing steps A, B, and C and omitting step D." They 
will not overrule you on that, and you should make that [judgment] 
independently because they are the action officers. They need to get 
legal advice that what they are 'going to do is lawful, and they do not 
want to overrule that advice and then follow it. There is no 
protection there. Whereas the solicitor general is often an advocate. 
So there is more reason to suggest that the solicitor general should 
follow some policy direction than OLC, which is giving legal advice. 
I can say that though I had interactions with the White House, 
not once in the more than a year that I was in the office was the 
position taken by the senior career people ever overruled during that 
time. And I think people have different styles for doing it. Mine was, 
because I think I had a more open communication than the attorney 
general, exactly the opposite of what would have been the case with 
Griffin Bell and President Carter. President Clinton and Attorney 
General Reno were not close and did not have an easy relationship. 
It was easier for me than for others to defend the position of the 
career people by going to the White House. And so I think it is very 
context-specific. 
But the last footnote is on a president that knows the law. We 
had one case I argued for the United States, William Jefferson 
Clinton v. Paula Corbin Jones,270 where I represented not President 
Clinton, but the United States. The difference was quite clear in my 
mind. If the president had called me the night before the argument 
and had given me cases that he had been reading that he thought I 
should cite that I did not think were in the interest of the United 
States, I would have decided not to cite those cases, and maybe the 
case would not have come out so well if I had, but that is my favorite 
example. 
Seth Waxman: I think it is worth underscoring a point that is 
often obscured, and that is the almost infinitesimally minute extent 
270. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
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to which a change in administration will have a palpable consequence 
to the positions taken or the arguments made either by the solicitor 
general in the Supreme Court or in cases over which the solicitor 
general has authority in the lower courts. So long as the men and 
women who work in the Justice Department understand that what 
matters is the long-term institutional interest of the United States, 
the political leadership does not, cannot, and should not have that 
much sway. Michael Dreeben did as good a job this morning as 
anyone I've ever heard in setting forth the different ways to think 
about what it means to consider the interests of the United States. It 
means a very great deal more than following the political 
predilections of the person who happens to be president at the time. 
I did not have the occasion to follow a solicitor general of 
another party. I never had to confront whether I was going to 
disavow a position taken by my predecessor. In the past year, of 
course, many people have asked me, "Is Ted Olson going to adhere 
to the position that you took before the Supreme Court in X or Yor 
Z?" My response always is, "I can't speak for the solicitor general, 
but the positions that we took were positions that represented the 
views of the United States." The merits brief filed by Solicitor 
General Olsen in the Adarand 271case tracks to a micron the position 
Solicitor General Waxman took in the brief filed at the petition stage 
of that case. 
We filed our brief in the Palazzolo272 case, an important Just 
Compensation Clause case while I was SG, but the case was argued 
after President Bush had been inaugurated. It occurred to me while I 
was preparing the brief that the president and the person I assumed 
would be solicitor general might have personal views about the Just 
Compensation Clause that would not coincide with the position 
reflected in the brief. I strove to be extra certain that the position we 
were advocating was in fact consistent with what the United States 
had always said, and that that position was indeed in the 
government's best interest. 
So the instances in which there has been an "overruling" are very 
few and far between. One thinks about the different views of the 
constitutionality of the must-carry provisions in the Cable Act273 that 
271. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). 
272. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
273. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. For the must-carry provisions, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (2000). 
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existed between Ken Starr and Drew Days, or the First Amendment 
questions in the Corporation for Public Broadcasting case274 that 
came up between the Carter and Reagan administrations. In both 
instances, the government changed positions. But these really are at 
the margins. I think the real testament is continuity. 
Charles Fried: The place where you saw the greatest temptation, 
and in fact temptation properly yielded to, was not so much in 
posi tions taken by the solicitor general bu t [in those] taken 
elsewhere in the department. When the Reagan administration came 
in, they found that there were consent decrees literally littering the 
legal landscape which sought to tie the government down till the 
end of time to very dubious positions. The Reagan administration 
did undertake to challenge those consent decrees, and I think we 
have something of that happening again with what one might call 
midnight regulations and midnight consent decrees that were put in 
by the Clinton administration. I think those are perhaps going to 
find themselves reconsidered. 
Earlier on there was some discussion of the Boston Harbor 
case.275 Maureen [Mahoney] talked about how the Bush 
administration took a politically painful but principled decision in 
favor of the decision that finally came out. Completely correct. I 
argued that case on behalf of the labor unions. The president then, 
in an attempt to meet the objection of his constituency that pushed 
the other way, sought to establish more or less the same policy by 
executive order. And I will report that the first action of President 
Clinton was to rescind that executive order. And among the first 
actions of President Bush was to reinstate it. So, at these political 
levels, you get something quite different than continuity. But after 
all, that is what elections are for. 
Walter Dellinger: But there is a point for continuity that I took 
one step further. When I met with President Clinton to discuss with 
him my need to return to private life, I came prepared to discuss who 
should be nominated to be solicitor general. I gave him a list of ten 
See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding constitutionaliry of 
must-carry provisions). 
274. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
275. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993). 
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people in several different categories. At the end of the day, I told 
him he should promptly nominate Seth Waxman. I told him that I 
thought the Senator from Utah276 would see that he was promptly 
confirmed, and that would be good for the office. [I told him] why 
Seth was the best choice. But I wanted to give the president a range 
of choices. 
I think I shocked him a bit. First I said, "An easy category is, you 
ought to consider one of the senior chief [circuit court] judges, the 
people who have the status of chief judges whom the Court would 
see as a peer. That is one way to look at this. But another category," 
I said, "I want you to think about is, given the difficulty the United 
States has in defending its positions on federalism, etcetera, I think 
there is something to be said to consider naming a Republican as 
solicitor general." And I reviewed several Republicans who I thought 
would meet the criteria. This was not working particularly well with 
the president. 
At the end of the day, I made my final recommendation to him, 
but it gave him comfort that I had discussed a number of people 
before making the argument for why it should be Seth. But I do 
think there is something to be said [for appointing a solicitor general 
of the other party]. A person would have to be particularly 
comfortable in that role, and sometimes there are positions that you 
might have other people argue. It may be a point that we have 
passed in our politics, but I thought at that moment in time it was at 
least worth the president considering. 
Thomas Lee: I want to make sure and leave plenty of time for 
audience questions. But before we do that, we have about a half-
hour left. In that time, let me suggest a couple of topics. Who is the 
solicitor general's client? How does the solicitor general go about 
resolving conflict among various departments or agencies of the 
federal government or the executive branch? We have heard lots of 
fun war stories about briefs that take two contrary positions. Judge 
Easterbrook told us about the Buckle:J77 case and three different 
briefs being filed. So there are some creative ways of resolving 
conflict. That is one issue that has come up. 
276. Senator Orrin Hatch, of Utah, was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at 
the time. 
277. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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Another related one has to do with the potential tension 
between the solicitor general's role as advocate to the executive 
branch pursuing the broad policy vision of the administration versus 
the solicitor general's role as an officer of the court. 
General Dellinger or General Waxman, would either of you like 
to address either of those? I know they have come up repeatedly, but 
I thought that now that we have got all of you here, maybe we could 
follow up since those seem to have been two important themes. 
Seth Waxman: I will be happy to do the first one. In many ways, 
for me the most exciting aspect of being solicitor general was having 
the responsibility for making the kinds of decisions that I adverted to 
before. In a country of 280 million souls, how does one ascertain 
what the interests of the United States are in litigation? That is the 
solicitor general's most challenging and exciting mission. 
The legislative history of the 1870 Judiciary Act278 is utterly clear 
that that responsibility is to decide and advocate positions that are in 
the interests of the United States. How' does one decide that? We 
are, if nothing else, a diverse and opinionated country. The way that 
these decisions get made in the SG's Office-and as I understand it 
this process has been relatively unchanged for decades at least-is for 
the SG to consider the views of all components of the government 
before formulating a position. The Solicitor General's Office does 
not go around trying to find intriguing policy issues to attack, 
righteous positions to take, or great cases to bring. It is an entirely 
reactive office. 
Let's say a prosecutor loses a suppression motion, or there is an 
important case the Environment Division wants to intervene in, or 
the Civil Rights Division wants to file an amicus brief, or a Treasury 
ruling is struck down, or the Consumer Products Safety Commission 
loses an important consent decree request, or anything of the sort. 
No appeal is permitted unless the solicitor general approves, in 
writing. The protocol is that the affected (losing) component of the 
government must submit to the SG an analytic memorandum that 
attaches all the relevant papers, explains the context, the legal issues, 
the reasons why it is in the interest of the United States to take it to 
the next step, and why the position that they advocate is correct. 
278. Judiciary Act ofl870, ch. 150,16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
173 
HeinOnline -- 2003 BYU L. Rev. 174 2003
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
The solicitor general does not just review that memo and agree 
or disagree. It is immediately forwarded to all components of the 
executive branch, whether within the Justice Department or outside, 
with either a policy or a law enforcement interest in that issue. These 
components are given the opportunity to express their own 
institutional views on the recommendation. The idea here is that the 
executive branch, with all of its hundreds of different offices and 
departments, serves as a surrogate for the country as a whole. When 
all the memos arrive, the case is assigned to a staff lawyer in the SG's 
Office, who writes his or her own analytic memo making a 
recommendation. The package then goes to one of the four deputies 
who adds his or her own recommendation. About half a dozen of 
these little (or big) bundles land in the solicitor general's in-box 
every day. 
Sometimes, there is a significant difference of opinion about 
what the United States should do. When that occurs, either one of 
my deputies or I would meet with representatives of all of the 
interested components. People would come together, having 
considered each other's institutional positions, to try and see if there 
was a way to hammer out a consensus view, or at least to understand 
each other's views. It's amazing how men and women of great 
intelligence and dedication can see things differently depending on 
the institutional perspective they bring to an issue. The entire process 
of trying to arrive at the position that best reflects the position of the 
United States is tremendously edifying; it's a shame more people 
cannot observe this function of government. It is essentially through 
this cooperative, collaborative effort that the SG receives the 
information and insight necessary to make the decision. That is the 
most thrilling part of the job. 
Walter Dellinger: As a footnote to that, even if there were only 
one department or agency involved, it is critically important, I think, 
and a point that we have gone a day and a half without mentioning, 
that the Solicitor General's Office is made up of generalists, 
including the solicitor general. You could imagine a system with 
some provision resolving conflicts among agencies where each of our 
great cabinet departments and agencies has general counsels, men 
and women of generally a great ability, who would advance their 
own arguments in court, or the ninety-three U.S. Attorney's Offices 
could carry both, but the fact that generalists bring their judgment 
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to bear upon questions often makes an enormous difference. For 
people who work in a single area for a single agency, it is very 
difficult from that perspective to have the broader interest of the 
United States in mind. Even if you were not resolving conflicts, the 
fact that you are reviewing judgments of particularized agencies, you 
are familiar with the Court and where its sentiments are, and you are 
taking into account a larger base of non-specialized information, I 
think, is altogether salutary for the positive development of the law. 
Charles Fried: It is particularly appropriate because, unlike the 
countries in which the Health and Human Services [Department] 
would bring social security matters to a social security court, and 
Department of Labor [matters would go] to a labor board, not only 
is the Solicitor General's Office an office of generalists, so is the 
Supreme Court. So it is generalists talking to generalists, and that is a 
very important translation function. 
Seth Waxman: It is very important, I think, to bear in mind that 
the world Walter just posited-where each U.S. attorney and each 
agency head is free to argue his or her own view of the interest of the 
United States to the Court-is precisely, and I mean exactly, what 
produced the position of solicitor general in the first place, and with 
very strong institutional impetus from the Supreme Court. In a series 
of nineteenth century cases, the Court had made rather clear that it 
had just about had it with different people standing up in different 
cases and saying, "The position of the United States on this law or 
this legal principle is X,"-that is, whatever was necessary in order to 
win the case in that particular instance-and then have somebody 
else later stand up in another case and say, "Well, in this case, you 
know, the position of the United States is Y" The conference report 
that accompanies the 1870 Judiciary Act explains Congress's vision 
about the role of the solicitor general. It says something very close to 
these exact words: "We propose to appoint a man of sufficient 
learning and intelligence and ability that he may appear in any court 
in the land from New Orleans to New York"-which apparently 
were the known limits of the civilized world at the time-"and there 
present the interest of the United States as it should be presented." 
That unifying theme-that the United States has to speak with one 
voice and provide the same interpretation of law whether it is in a 
state court in Maine or a federal court in San Diego-was the 
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animating principle behind creation of the position, and it remains 
the animating principle of the office to this very day. 
Kenneth Starr: Let me add a point that I think reinforces the 
structural and process points that are being made. What you have 
heard in the last few minutes in terms of structure and process, I 
think, is quite powerfully true. I think it rings true with anyone who 
is privileged to serve in the office, whether as solicitor general or in a 
career position. There are those issues, however, where the lens 
through which one looks at the world will give rise to certain 
questions. Certainly the discussion thus far brings to mind the lens of 
concern about judicial power. When one is in the executive branch, 
frequently it is a Federalist Nos. 47 and 51 concern on the part of the 
executive about the legislative power seeking to bring everything 
into its vortex, but obviously it depends upon the context. I do recall 
quite vividly that when I came into the office (ironically after I had 
served in the judiciary), one of the recurring areas of concern-and 
the lens [through which] we examined the world caused us to be 
concerned-was about the exercise of the judicial power in ways that 
seemed to trench upon, or at least compromise, institutions of 
self-government. And so Charles referred to consent decrees and so 
forth. We found continually in my four years in the office issues with 
respect to: Have the judges gone too far? Has judicial power, even if 
appropriately exercised at the outset, been extended overmuch? Has 
there been a displacement of institutions of representative 
government? And that lens may vary somewhat. I doubt if it is a 
dramatic variance, but I think there will be subtle variances in the 
way that one looks at the world, and that may, at times, frankly, 
trump the very considered process-type points that have been made. 
Drew Days: I think the question, "who is the client?" is really a 
riddle. When I was the head of the Civil Rights Division and I woke 
up in the morning, I knew who my client was. I was my client. And 
the head of the Antitrust Division knew that he or she was a client 
because these are the policymaking institutions within the Justice 
Department. As solicitor general, when I woke up I had no clue who 
my client was or was going to be during the day. I think it is more a 
process of ruling out than ruling in. We know who are not our 
clients: states, municipalities, private parties for the most part. But 
when it comes down to the 9uestion of who is the client, it really is a 
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matter of analyzing the situation and reasoning through a situation 
to determine: Are there federal laws involved? Are there federal 
interests at issue? And so forth and so on. For purposes of 
conversation, I guess that entity becomes one's client. But it could 
be that by the end of the day, a better client will have come down 
the pike. 
Question from Audience: Because of the intensity of the work 
of the solicitor general, are we moving towards a tradition and 
expectation that the solicitor general would serve four years despite 
the political fortunes of the president, and is it the kind of job, given 
its intensity, in which somebody could serve eight years? 
Charles Fried: There has only been one solicitor general in 
recent times who approached that, and that is Erwin Griswold. He 
served Lyndon Johnson and then he served Nixon in the first Nixon 
administration, but that is the last time that happened. I would think 
it very unfortunate-not a good idea-for two reasons. First, you 
lose freshness. You think you own the office. You think it is yours, 
and you begin to be a bureaucrat in it rather than a fresh 
intelligence. That is the first thing. And the second, as everybody has 
in various degrees and in various ways acknowledged or even 
emphasized, is the fact that at the end of the day the solicitor general 
speaks as the appointee of the president. Well, that is much 
attenuated if you are just routinely kept on. It is the reason, quite 
frankly, why I made clear a year before the end of the Reagan 
administration that at the end of that administration I would move 
on. 
Question from Audience: What is the process by which a 
president appoints a solicitor general, and do you see common 
threads that run through that process? 
Drew Days: Ken told me I should answer this, and I am not sure 
quite how to answer it. I think it is often like a bolt of lightning. It is 
somewhat fickle. Let's put it this way: it does not hurt to be the 
lawyer who argues the case before the Supreme Court that results in 
a person being named the president of the United States. We can 
start there. Someone said to me, "Well, do you think he's going to 
name Ted Olson as solicitor general?" I said, "Well, that's a pretty 
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good possibility." He said, "Well, don't you think it would be seen 
as a quid pro quo?" I said, "If not now, when?" 
It varies. The people who have occupied the SG's Office have 
been academics, lawyers, judges, and for the most part, they have 
been very close to the presidents from a political standpoint, a family 
standpoint. They are politically connected. So there is no one 
process. It really changes from administration to administration. 
I wanted very much to be solicitor general, but there continued 
to be a problem of finding an attorney general for the Clinton 
administration. I found that to be a real impediment to my making 
my case to the attorney general. First it was Zoe Baird, and then 
Judge Kimba Wood, and then finally Janet Reno.279 All the while I 
was waiting to be discovered. And it happened. 
Kenneth Starr: I think in the first Bush administration-and I 
am sure Charles can speak with more authority to this, even though 
he was not part of the administration-but I think there was a 
concentrated effort to find a judge. I think those who were seriously 
considered were, in the main, judges. But if you go back over the last 
generation, I think Drew's answer is exactly right. They are drawn 
from the professorial ranks or the judicial ranks or some combination 
thereof, or then, logically, those who have served in the Justice 
Department-and Seth is a beautiful example of a distinguished 
lawyer in private practice who then proved his mettle in the Justice 
Department. But I think that is a tougher route. At least, it is 
certainly tougher at the outset of the administration, where there will 
be a tendency, I think, to go to the academy, a Professor Bork, a 
Judge McCree, a Dean Griswold, and the like-and Professor [Rex] 
Lee. 
Walter Dellinger: I know that Drew and Seth and I, none of us 
knew the president before going into the Justice Department. I did 
not. Did you, Ken? 
279. In 1993, President Clinton nominated Zoe Baird, then Kimba Wood, to serve as 
attorney general, but both withdrew their nominations. Janet Reno was ultimately nominated 
and confirmed as President Clinton's attorney general. 
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Kenneth Starr: I knew the president, but not all that terribly 
well, and [our acquaintance] was rather ancient. I knew him when he 
was in Congress in Texas. 
Walter Dellinger: And Charles, you did not know President 
Reagan? 
Charles Fried: I did not know the president. My situation was 
special and rather like Seth's in a way. I had been the principal 
deputy in the office and the office was vacant from, I think it was 
March or so, until I was named. So, I was acting in the office and 
doing all these things and they had a chance to get a really good 
look at me. There was the abortion brief80 and also the brief in the 
Wygant 281 case. I had a big hand in writing it, and so did Sam Alito, 
who had this marvelous phrase saying that a particular Mrican 
American baseball player would not have served as a great role model 
if the fences had been pulled in every time he was up at bat, a point 
which some people were greatly offended by because they thought it 
to be pamphleteering. I thought it was entirely appropriate. If it had 
been made in the other direction, it would have been applauded 
rather than deplored by the New York Times. But I was able to bring 
those briefs to the senators upon my courtesy calls and say, "Now, 
this is what you will get. Take it or leave it." So, I had been in the 
job. That is unusual. 
On the question of judges, you are quite right. I had a 
conversation with the attorney general before I left. He asked for my 
suggestion, and I gave him a list of three names, all three of whom 
were judges. [About] one of them I said, "The situation may 
develop where you may want to name a Democrat." So there were 
two Republicans and one Democrat. 
Question from Audience: General Days made a comment 
about the Carter administration and delegation skills, and referred to 
quite different leadership traits. General Waxman made a comment 
about the decisive nature of the office and how to make the calls. 
General Starr [emphasized] the opposite-represent the president, 
280. Thornburgh v. Am. Coli. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
281. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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more or less. From what you have seen, [which approach] would you 
say was more effective? 
Seth Waxman: I will take a crack at it just because I came down 
sort of emphatically in favor of the decisive role. The year in which I 
worked as Walter Dellinger's deputy really was the most wondrous 
professional period I have ever had. For both Walter and me, it was 
our first time in the Solicitor General's Office. Walter came to the 
job from a distinguished career in the academy. I think Walter had 
handled one or two complex cases as a consultant, otherwise his 
background was purely of the academy. By contrast, I had spent 
almost two decades as a litigator-trying and arguing cases in state 
and federal courts (including one case in the Supreme Court). We 
had offices in close proximity, and on the weekends, we would 
inevitably be there on Saturdays and Sundays working in our quiet 
and majestic offices. We used to go back and forth in our socks to 
talk about the cases we were handling. At one point several months 
into the job, I recall Walter saying, "You know, I'm wrestling with 
twenty-odd fascinating issues right now. Back in myoId job, I would 
have spent two years arriving at my concluded views. First, I'd 
arrange a research seminar where I would have a bunch of students 
thinking, writing papers about it. Then I would get a grant to think 
about it myself. Then I would give some talks. Maybe I would take a 
semester visiting at another institution and then teach a full course 
on the subject. Mter two years, I would publish a full-blown article 
setting forth my concluded views. But here, in this office, we have to 
make decisions in these cases in a week or two week's time. The time 
compression is just amazing." My response to Walter was, "You 
know, I have exactly the opposite reaction. In my prior life, 
everything was like this. [Waxman repeatedly snaps his fingers.] We 
were constantly under pressure to make decisions and present them 
to courts-in briefs, in arguments, and through witnesses and 
documents." In the world I inhabited before joining the SG's Office, 
we'd receive an order from court giving us twenty-four hours to 
submit a brief on some emergency matter. Or, a client needed to 
know right away whether we are going to go in and seek a temporary 
restraining order. I told Walter that, in my new position, I felt the 
tremendous luxury of having several whole weeks to decide 
important issues. Those are two perspectives of it. Thank goodness 
the SG has weeks to decide important things; but thank goodness 
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too that at the end of that fixed period a decision has to be made. 
Otherwise, there are a raft of issues we'd still be puzzling over. 
Walter Dellinger: Let. me just add this, to go back to the 
previous question [about selecting a solicitor general]. There are 
many different kinds of backgrounds. All things being equal, I would 
prefer having a very senior judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals, even though only one of this distinguished group meets 
that description. And even though none of this distinguished group 
were close to the president, I think on balance the country and the 
department are going to be very well served by the fact that Solicitor 
General Olson is close to and does have the complete confidence of 
the president. I do not think that means he brings politics to the 
Justice Department. I think that means that when he listens to the 
career deputies, to the Ed Needlers and to the Michael Dreebens, 
when he hears from the career people in all of the departments and 
he reaches a decision about what is in the long-range interests, no 
one is going to second-guess Ted Olson at the White House. I think 
all things being equal, that is very, very good for the department. He 
will be situated in the department; he will be hearing from these 
people; he will be formulating his judgments with that in mind; and 
there will be no one in this administration that can possibly 
second-guess or backdoor Ted Olson. I think everything else being 
equal, that is a good thing to have as solicitor general. 
Question from Audience: We have heard a lot about the 
representation by the Solicitor General's Office of the executive 
branch and advocating for the president. I would like to know, just 
to broaden the discussion to the legislative branch, how were the 
interactions [with the legislative branch]? Were there any interactions 
or attempts to influence from the legislative branch? We have heard 
about the executive input. But we have heard several times that you 
represent the whole government. Should the legislature have its own 
solicitor general?' 
Charles Fried: The very most sufficient reason why the solicitor 
general so assiduously defends the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress is that if he did not, there would not be such an office. 
Now, there may be other reasons. Indeed, there are. But, as I say, 
that is a sufficient reason. 
181 
HeinOnline -- 2003 BYU L. Rev. 182 2003
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
Drew Days: Indeed, there is an office in the Senate and one that 
rotates in the House of Representatives as a result of the 1978 Ethics 
in Government Act. 282 It is a very interesting statute because it 
authorizes lawyers from the Congress to represent the Congress in 
the Supreme Court on matters that have to do with the power of the 
Congress. That, however, does not respond to Charles's point, 
which is a major one: to the extent that the solicitor general allows 
cases to be handled by the lawyers in the Congress, he loses control 
over the matters, loses the very thing that he cherishes most, and 
that is being able to control the movement of cases to the Supreme 
Court and engaging in what we like to call the orderly development 
of the law. 
But [consider] a situation that we discussed in another context: 
what happens when the solicitor general does not want to or does 
not feel capable of defending an act of Congress that has been 
challenged as unconstitutional? Perhaps others on the panel have had 
this experience as well. But I had a couple of situations where I 
found that I could not in good conscience represent the position of 
the Congress with respect to a statute. One of the cases had to do 
with a statute that was passed in 1935, I believe, and it was so out of 
touch with modern understandings of gender equality that quite 
frankly I did not feel that I wanted to be the one in the Clinton 
administration taking a position that upheld discriminatory treatment 
of women as compared to men with respect to immigration and 
citizenship. What happened in that case was as required by the 
statute: the attorney general is required to notify the leaders of the 
Congress if she is not going to defend the statute, which then 
triggers the power of the lawyers in the Congress to provide the 
defense. But I think this had a happy ending. We told Congress that 
we would not defend, but we then worked with a committee of 
Congress to prepare a fixer amendment to the statute which tended 
to remove the constitutional problem and allow life to go on without 
any headaches-or almost no headaches. 
Kenneth Starr: Let me add a brief footnote in terms of the 
collaborative process that was evident during my tenure in the case 
282. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521,92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (2000)). 
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of Nixon v. United States. 283 Walter Nixon [was] a district judge who 
was impeached. Then in his trial in the Senate [he] was subjected to 
what he viewed as an unconstitutional process, namely a fact-finding 
or fact-gathering, I should say, by a committee of the Senate, some 
ten Senators, five from each party. The matter wended its way to the 
Supreme Court. And even though the constitutionality of the 
procedures of the United States Senate was at issue in the case, it still 
fell, with absolutely no rancor whatsoever, to the solicitor general to 
defend the constitutionality [of the Senate procedures] if it could be 
done, and it obviously was easy for us to in fact do that. The 
Supreme Court eventually upheld the power of the Senate to engage 
in such fact-gathering by a committee as long as there was a trial 
before the full body of the Senate. But in that process we worked 
very collaboratively with the very distinguished counsel to the senate, 
Mike Davidson, and his staff. Mike, I believe, served for about 
twenty years, and was a wonderful repository of information as well 
as guidance. And so we had any number of meetings as well as the 
receiving of information from the historical materials that Mike and 
his staff had very assiduously gathered. And we viewed that as simply 
our function. That was our role: to defend in that context the 
prerogatives of the Senate. 
Thomas Lee: That is about all the time we have. I do not know 
that you will find five people whose time is more in demand than 
these five gentlemen. I want them to know on behalf of all of us how 
grateful we are for their giving us of their time today. 
Dean Reese Hansen: I think that brings us to the moment of 
conclusion of the conference. We wish all of our participants 
Godspeed and best wishes as you travel home. May the skies be 
smooth and sailing clear and passage safe. We hope to have you each 
back sometime soon for another occasion. 
283. 506 u.s. 224 (1993). 
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